Sex, Preference, and Consent
When and Where
Speakers
Description
Sex, Preference, and Consent
Sometimes people consent to sex not because they want to have it, but because they find refusal intolerably costly. These encounters seem to involve sexual wrongings–but why? The consent theory holds that they are not fully consensual. I object to this theory on grounds that the wrongfulness persists even when the conditions that ordinarily diminish consent’s transformative power are not met. I propose an alternative theory, the preference theory, which holds that the sex is wrong because it opposes the consent-giver’s preference, which is distinct from his or her willingness. Consent simply prevents the violation of one duty (the duty not to have sex with someone who doesn’t consent), but not another (the duty not to have sex with someone who’d rather not have it.)
► this event is hybrid. Join in person at the Centre for Ethics (Larkin building, room 200) or online.
